The 10-man team that made up the ISG -- five Democrats, five Republicans -- was skewed toward the president's side of things from the start, but that's not really heavy criticism. It was expected. One of the chairs of the group is James Baker, the Bushes' fixer since back in the days when poppy was playing puppeteer behind the swiftly deteriorating brain of Ronald Reagan. Hell, they go back even further, really, to the beginnings of their political lives -- Baker was Poppy Bush's campaign manager during the man's unsuccessful run for the U.S. Senate in 1970. Baker was Reagan's Chief of Staff, then his Sec. of the Treasury, then Bush I's Sec. of State. He ran Bush II's recount-halting operation in Florida during the contested 2000 election, and represented Saudi Arabia when it was sued by the families of 9/11 victims. The man has spent his political life fixing the problems of the Bush family and its allies.

Meanwhile, the other chair, Lee Hamilton, is the Republican's go-to Democrat when they need someone who will whitewash a Republican cover-up and give a whiff of bipartisanship to an otherwise partisan proceeding. He has spent most of his career putting lipstick on pigs. Hamilton was the chair of the Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, and decided during the Iran-Contra hearings that investigating the POTUS and V-P wouldn't be "good for the country." Since then, Hamilton has served as the vice-chair of the 9/11 Commission, which famously refused to investigate pre-9/11 intelligence or put administration officials under oath. And now, here he is again chairing the Iraq Study Group.

The other Republicans in the ISG include Lawrence Eagleburger, who succeeded Baker as Poppy Bush's Sec. of State; Ed Meese, Reagan's attorney general, deeply involved in Iran-Contra, corrupt and instigator of the free-speech-trampling Meese Commission; Sandra Day O'Connor, who likely needs no introduction; and Alan Simpson, an admittedly moderate Republican out of Wyoming who, however, has close ties to Dick Cheney and Poppy Bush.

And the Democrats? Vernon Jordan, the only man on the committee never to have a major position in any administration, but who currently sits on the board Dow Jones, whose media wing is notoriously far-right (see the Wall Street Journal editorial page); Leon Panetta, former Republican who served as Clinton's chief of staff for three years; William Perry, who served as Clinton's Sec. of Defense for three years; and Chuck Robb, who co-founded the right-leaning Democratic Leadership Council and whose last successful campaign for senator from Virginia, in 1994, included endorsements by major Republican figures such as William Colby, Elliot Richardson, William Ruckelshaus, and then-Republican James Webb.

See what's happening here? The ISG was billed as a bipartisan group, people who have proven they can all reach across the aisle. Instead, it's a group of Democrats who have done far more than reach across the aisle, often times dwelling on the other side, mixed in with a bunch of Bush I and Reagan administration officials, all of them chaired by two men who have a history of cleaning up messes for the Bush family.

And so it goes.

But nevermind the group's make-up. The findings are what's important here, and it's those findings that pretty much spell disaster for Iraq. What follows is the Iraq Study Group's Executive Summary (because, you know, our Chief Executive can't be bothered to read the whole thing. So why should you?). After that, I condense it further, and then offer a few helpful pointers.

Executive Summary
The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. There is no
path that can guarantee success, but the prospects can be improved.
In this report, we make a number of recommendations
for actions to be taken in Iraq, the United States, and the region.
Our most important recommendations call for new and
enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region,
and a change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq
that will enable the United States to begin to move its combat
forces out of Iraq responsibly. We believe that these two recommendations
are equally important and reinforce one another.
If they are effectively implemented, and if the Iraqi government
moves forward with national reconciliation, Iraqis will have an
opportunity for a better future, terrorism will be dealt a blow,
stability will be enhanced in an important part of the world, and
America’s credibility, interests, and values will be protected.
The challenges in Iraq are complex. Violence is increasing
in scope and lethality. It is fed by a Sunni Arab insurgency, Shiite
militias and death squads, al Qaeda, and widespread criminality.
Sectarian conflict is the principal challenge to stability.
The Iraqi people have a democratically elected government, yet
it is not adequately advancing national reconciliation, providing
basic security, or delivering essential services. Pessimism is pervasive.
If the situation continues to deteriorate, the consequences
could be severe. A slide toward chaos could trigger the collapse
of Iraq’s government and a humanitarian catastrophe. Neighboring
countries could intervene. Sunni-Shia clashes could
spread. Al Qaeda could win a propaganda victory and expand
its base of operations. The global standing of the United States
could be diminished. Americans could become more polarized.
During the past nine months we have considered a full
range of approaches for moving forward. All have flaws. Our
recommended course has shortcomings, but we firmly believe
that it includes the best strategies and tactics to positively influence
the outcome in Iraq and the region.

External Approach
The policies and actions of Iraq’s neighbors greatly affect its
stability and prosperity. No country in the region will benefit in
the long term from a chaotic Iraq. Yet Iraq’s neighbors are not
doing enough to help Iraq achieve stability. Some are undercutting
stability.

The United States should immediately launch a new
diplomatic offensive to build an international consensus for stability
in Iraq and the region. This diplomatic effort should include
every country that has an interest in avoiding a chaotic
Iraq, including all of Iraq’s neighbors. Iraq’s neighbors and key
states in and outside the region should form a support group to
reinforce security and national reconciliation within Iraq, neither
of which Iraq can achieve on its own.

Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence events
within Iraq and their interest in avoiding chaos in Iraq, the
United States should try to engage them constructively. In
seeking to influence the behavior of both countries, the United
States has disincentives and incentives available. Iran should
stem the flow of arms and training to Iraq, respect Iraq’s sovereignty
and territorial integrity, and use its influence over Iraqi
Shia groups to encourage national reconciliation. The issue of
Iran’s nuclear programs should continue to be dealt with by the
five permanent members of the United Nations Security
Council plus Germany. Syria should control its border with
Iraq to stem the flow of funding, insurgents, and terrorists in
and out of Iraq.

The United States cannot achieve its goals in the Middle
East unless it deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict and
regional instability. There must be a renewed and sustained
commitment by the United States to a comprehensive Arab-
Israeli peace on all fronts: Lebanon, Syria, and President Bush’s
June 2002 commitment to a two-state solution for Israel and
Palestine. This commitment must include direct talks with, by,
and between Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians (those who accept
Israel’s right to exist), and Syria.

As the United States develops its approach toward Iraq
and the Middle East, the United States should provide additional
political, economic, and military support for Afghanistan,
including resources that might become available as combat
forces are moved out of Iraq.

Internal Approach
The most important questions about Iraq’s future are now the
responsibility of Iraqis. The United States must adjust its role
in Iraq to encourage the Iraqi people to take control of their
own destiny.

The Iraqi government should accelerate assuming responsibility
for Iraqi security by increasing the number and
quality of Iraqi Army brigades. While this process is under way,
and to facilitate it, the United States should significantly increase
the number of U.S. military personnel, including combat
troops, imbedded in and supporting Iraqi Army units. As
these actions proceed, U.S. combat forces could begin to move
out of Iraq.

The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve
to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over primary
responsibility for combat operations. By the first quarter
of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security
situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for
force protection could be out of Iraq. At that time, U.S. combat
forces in Iraq could be deployed only in units embedded with
Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and special operations teams,
and in training, equipping, advising, force protection, and
search and rescue. Intelligence and support efforts would continue.
A vital mission of those rapid reaction and special operations
forces would be to undertake strikes against al Qaeda in
Iraq.

As redeployment proceeds, military leaders should emphasize
training and education of forces that have returned to
the United States in order to restore the force to full combat
capability. As equipment returns to the United States, Congress
should appropriate sufficient funds to restore the equipment
over the next five years.

The United States should work closely with Iraq’s leaders
to support the achievement of specific objectives—or milestones
—on national reconciliation, security, and governance.
Miracles cannot be expected, but the people of Iraq have the
right to expect action and progress. The Iraqi government
needs to show its own citizens—and the citizens of the United
States and other countries—that it deserves continued support.
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, in consultation with the
United States, has put forward a set of milestones critical for
Iraq. His list is a good start, but it must be expanded to include
milestones that can strengthen the government and benefit the
Iraqi people. President Bush and his national security team
should remain in close and frequent contact with the Iraqi
leadership to convey a clear message: there must be prompt action
by the Iraqi government to make substantial progress toward
the achievement of these milestones.

If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and
makes substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones
on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the
United States should make clear its willingness to continue
training, assistance, and support for Iraq’s security forces and to
continue political, military, and economic support. If the Iraqi
government does not make substantial progress toward the
achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security,
and governance, the United States should reduce its political,
military, or economic support for the Iraqi government.
It is clear that the Iraqi government will need assistance
from the United States for some time to come, especially in
carrying out security responsibilities. Yet the United States
must make it clear to the Iraqi government that the United
States could carry out its plans, including planned redeployments,
even if the Iraqi government did not implement their
planned changes. The United States must not make an openended
commitment to keep large numbers of American troops
deployed in Iraq.

Our report makes recommendations in several other areas.
They include improvements to the Iraqi criminal justice system,
the Iraqi oil sector, the U.S. reconstruction efforts in Iraq,
the U.S. budget process, the training of U.S. government personnel,
and U.S. intelligence capabilities.

Conclusion
It is the unanimous view of the Iraq Study Group that these
recommendations offer a new way forward for the United
States in Iraq and the region. They are comprehensive and
need to be implemented in a coordinated fashion. They should
not be separated or carried out in isolation. The dynamics of
the region are as important to Iraq as events within Iraq.
The challenges are daunting. There will be difficult days
ahead. But by pursuing this new way forward, Iraq, the region,
and the United States of America can emerge stronger.

***********************************************************************************************************************************

You get all that? So, in short, the ISG says:
1) The situation in Iraq is bad and getting worse (yeah, no shit) -- thus, Bush's current strategy is failing
2) The U.S. must commit to heavy diplomacy with Iran and Syria
3) The U.S. must have "direct talks with, by, and between Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians (those who accept Israel’s right to exist), and Syria"
4) Inside Iraq, U.S. forces should be out of combat roles by the beginning of 2008.
5) U.S. forces should serve to advise and train the Iraqi army, and also be embedded with Iraqi army troops in the field.
6) (And this one is real important) The ISG's findings "are comprehensive and need to be implemented in a coordinated fashion. They should not be separated or carried out in isolation."

Now, Bush has already said, "we probably won't agree with every proposal." But the ISG states in no uncertain terms that, for success, every proposal should be implemented together. So that pretty much tosses aside this whole idea. What's more, I expect the president to take the stupidest route possible -- he will refuse to increase diplomatic ties in the region, while also embedding U.S. troops in Iraqi units as the report recommends. To quote retired Army Lt. Col. Ralph Peters, from a story in The Nation, this will create "tens of thousands of hostages in uniform."

Political expediency will lead Bush to draw down combat troops and embed U.S. troops with Iraqi forces. But he'll be damned before he starts talking with Syria. Add both of these factors up, and you get a continued supply of bombs and guns from Iran, plus a couple of U.S. troops sitting in the middle of every squad of angry, well-armed Shiites who often owe more allegiance to paramilitary militias than the actual government.

What could possibly go wrong?